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INJURIES CAUSED BY WORK-RELATED STRESS ARE NOT COGNIZABLE UNDER THE
JONES ACT

William C. Skye v. Maersk L ine, L imited Corporation
751 F.3d 1262
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
(Decided May 15, 2014)
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that excessive work hours and erratic sleep schedule
resulting in physical injury to a seaman in the form of left ventricular hypertrophy was not
cognizable under the Jones Act.

William Skye fi led suit against his employer, Maersk L ine, Limited Corporation ("Maersk"), to
recover money damages for negligence for an injury stemming from excessive work hours and erratic
sleep schedule. 1 The action was brought under the Jones Act, 46 U . S.C. § 30104, which provides a
cause of action in negligence for a "seaman personally injured in the course of employment. " 2 Skye
3
worked as chief mate for over eight years on The Sea/and Pride, which was operated by Maersk.
Skye' s job duties required him to work overtime, which adversely affected his health due to fatigue,
stress, and lack of sleep. 4 In 2008, Skye was diagnosed with left ventricular hypertrophy, a thickening
of the heart wall of the left ventricle, which his cardiologist attributed to hypertension. 5 Skye' s
cardiologist concluded that the "continued physical stress related to [Skye' s] job, with long hours and
lack of sleep" caused his hypertension, which, in turn, caused his left ventricular hypertrophy.6
The district court instructed the jury to decide whether Skye' s i njury and its causes were
7
physical or emotional. The jury returned a verdict finding that Skye sustained a physical injury. 8 The
9
district court entered judgment in favor of Skye after the jury verdict in his favor. The jury awarded
Skye $2,362,299.00 in damages, which the district court reduced to $590,574.75 to account for Skye' s
10
comparative negligence. Maersk moved for summary judgment o n the grounds that Skye could not
recover for an injury caused by work-related stress and, alternatively, that the statute of limitations
12
barred his claim. 1 1 The district court denied the motion. Maersk appealed the decision of the district
13
court.
On appeal, the E leventh Circuit vacated the district court ' s judgment and held that Skye' s claim
4
was not cognizable under the Jones Act. 1 The Federal Employers' L iability Act, and by extension, the

1 Skye v. Maersk Line, Ltd. Corp. , 751 F.3d 1262, 1263 ( I I th Cir. 2014).
2 /d. See also 46 U.S.C. § 30 I 04. The Jones Act provides a cause of action in negligence for "a seaman" personally injured
"in the course of employment," in the same way that the Federal Employers Liability Act provides a cause of action in
negligence for injured railroad employees against their employers. 45 U.S.C. §51 et seq.
3 !d. at 1263.

4 !d.

5 /d. at 1264.
6 !d.
7 !d. at 1265.
8 /d. at 1265.
9 !d. at 1262.
1 0 /d. at 1263. See also Consolidated Rail Corp.

v. Gotshall, 512 U.S. 532, 532 (1 99 4). The Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs could not recover for work-related stress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
11/d.at l264.

12 /d.
1 3 /d. at 1262.
14 !d. at 1267.

5

Jones Act, are "aimed at ensuring ' the security of the person from physical invasions or menaces . ' "1 5
For employers to be liable, the employees' injuries must be "caused by the negligent conduct of their
employers that threatens them imminently with physical impact. " 1 6 Therefore, because work-related
stress is not a "physical peril , " the Jones Act does not allow Skye to recover for injuries caused by
7
work-related stress. 1
The facts of this case paral leled the facts in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, where the
Supreme Court held that inj uries caused by the long-term effects of work-related stress are not
cognizable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act because they are not caused by any physical
impact or fear from the threat of physical impact. 1 8 The Supreme Court adopted the zone-of-danger
test for inj uries not caused by a physical impact-"a worker within the zone of danger of physical
impact will be able to recover for emotional inj ury caused by fear of physical inj ury to himself,
whereas a worker outside the zone wil l not . " 1 9 Therefore, the Court would allow recovery for damages
for inj uries sustained as a result of his employer' s negl igence only if the inj uries were suffered while
within the zone of danger of a physical impact. 20 Here, Skye alleged that he "was injured while aboard
the vesse l " because "reduced manning and other conditions caused excessive duties and duty time . "2 1
Skye also complained that Maersk was negligent when it "failed to provide him with reasonable
working hours, " adequate personnel, time, equipment, and rest hours, and overworked him "to the
point of fatigue. "22 However, Skye was diagnosed with left ventricular hypertrophy, an inj ury which
gradually developed over a period of time. 2 3 No physical impact occurred, and, therefore, no zone of
danger existed. Accordingly, Skye's injury does not fal l within the zone of danger.
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the central focus of the Federal Employers Liability Act and
the Jones Act is "on physical perils. "2 4 "An arduous work schedule and an irregular sleep schedule are
not physical perils . "25 The cause of Skye' s inj ury was work-related stress; it is inconsequential that
Skye developed a "physical inj ury. "26 A physical inj ury is not enough. 27 And, according to the
Supreme Court, awarding Skye for his injury would potentially lead to " 'a flood of trivial suits, the
possibil ity of fraudulent claims . . . and the specter of unlimited and unpredictable liability ' because
there is no way to predict what effect a stressful work environment-compared to a physical accident
[ . . . ] -would have on any given employee. "28
Accordingly, Skye' s complaint is not cognizable under the Jones Act. The Eleventh C ircuit
reversed the district court's decision and rendered judgment in favor of Maersk.
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15 /d. at 1265. See Consolidated Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 555-56. (quoting Lancaster
8 13 (ih Cir. 1 985)).
1 6 /d. See Consolidated Rail Corp., 5 12 U.S. at 555-56.
1 7 /d. at 1265- 1266.
18 /d. at 1266. See Consolidated Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 558.
1 9 /d. See Consolidated Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 556.
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Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. , 773 F.2d 807,

at 1264.
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See Consolidated Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 557.
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